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by Michael Lipton2
The Pearson Report is the last, bravest, most
intelligent effort to redefine and make sense of the
traditional approach to aid. lt is unlikely to succeed
in this aim, which is only one of several, partly
because rich men are too selfish; but the real trouble
is that the traditional approach to aid (as a bridge to
help a country to develop on its own) has never been
properly thought through. Fortunately the Report
begins the movement towards the assessment of projects
upon clearly stated criteria, from which a more use-
f ul approach to aid may emerge. This approach will
develop, in the context of particular projects, the
traditional justification for aid: that through par-
ticular projects it promotes development and thereby
enables the recipient to become self-sufficient.
Because this justification has so far been attempted
in vague and general terms, scarce aid has gone to
projects with low yields, and the whole aid pro-
gramme has thereby become suspect even among the
liberal elites who play so important a part in the
"aid lobby".
We cannot run away from the lack of relation-
ship between the aid per head, received by a poor
country, and the growth performance achieved by that
country. Numerous statisticians, including some
working for the Pearson Commission, have tried and
failed to find such a link. Excuses are easy to
invent: not all "aid" is aid, growth is not the same
as development, and even true aid may (perhaps
rightly) go to the very countries with the greatest
lI am grateful, for confluents on an earlier draft, to
Richard Jolly, Dudley Seers and John White, among
thers. Responsibility, for both facts and opinionb
remains entirely my own. And I am even less sure
than üsual that the opinions are right.
2Fcl]ow of the Institute of Development Studies.
-10-
difficulties in generating true development. But even
when statisticians allow for these, it does not help
much. Even for a group of similar poor countries, no-
body has yet found a statistically significant link
between non-military aid per head (even net of repay-
ments) and any combination of development indicators
such as growth, equalisation, employment, workforce-
industrialisation, etc.
The aid lobby, to which I belong, has not faced
this fact, rather as professional developers have re-
fused to fact the virtually perfect overlap of poverty
and tropicality. In each case the reason for the eva-
sioii is the wish to do good, and the fear that one
admits defeat by recognising that climate is a constraint
or that aid has been misdirected. In each case, the
reasoning exposes a good heart but a muddled head. If
climate affects the rate of development from a partic-
ular investment pattern, then tropical investment
allocations require different choices from temperate
ones1 - perhaps, in view of the greater risks of rain-
failfailure, even different criteria, taking account
of risk. If past aid has, in general, not demonstrably
helped development, let us see how to use aid better in
future. To follow instead a path of well-meaning good-
will - to argue that climate doesn't matter, or to pick
happy but isolated instances where aid has triumphed -
is not to further the cause of development. It is,
rather, to endow those who wish developed countries to
contract out of the aid effort - the Powel].s and the
Passmen - with an intellectual respectability that they
do not deserve.
1
Failure to realise just how different the tropics are,
far from being an anticolonial revolution, has seriously
hampéred development by fostering misplaced imitation.
The long, hardly credible delay in research into im-
proved seeds - to exploit the special tropical prospect
of year-round cropping - is a case in point.
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The Pearson Report avoids the issue of the non-
link between past aid and development by positing an
unrealistic series of future aid L'r:'ts. If all this
aid could be made available, indeed it might produce a
lot of development in total, even if some of it yielded
very little. The cat of poverty might, in principle,
be drowned in the cream of aid. However, the annual
growth rate of official development assistance in 1961-
68 was 3.2 per cent (in 1964-68 only 1.9 per cent). The
rate of growth required to reach the Pearson target by
1975 is 14.1 per cent per year!1 As for total resource
flows from rich countries to poor (including private
overseas investment), they fell froni 0.89 per cent of
rich donors' GNP in 1960 to 0.77 per cent in 1968; the
Pearscn Commission expects them to rise to 1 per cent
by 1975 (Table 7.2)! The big rise in public aid is
especially unlikely, since 18 per cent of all public
aid in 1967 - $1.5 bn. from the U.S. alone
- comprised
free food transfers, which donors and recipients alike
want to phase out (pp. 151-2). To expect Congress to
replace this food by cash is somewhat hopeful, and
the Commission's discussion of this matter is quite
unsatisfactory. It is true that Britain proposes to
step up her aid (though not to the Pearson target),
and the Commission deserves some of the credit for
this. But "the problem of will", and hence of the
Pearson volume target, remains obstinately stuck in
the U.S. Congress.
The targets on terms of aid and tying, too,
project a sharp reversal of trends in the 1960s.
Neither on volume nor on terms is there much sign
of the political muscle required to put history into
reverse and approach Pearson targets. We, the pro-
fessional developers, will of course continue to
press our Governments to do what is right, pointing
1Partners in Development, Annex II, Table 19. The
target is that donors, as a whole, should transfer
070 per cent of GNP as official development assis-
tance by 1975.
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eut that rich countries also have a lon--tcrt
interest in a politically stble and ccono:i.cally
developing world, etc.t But a small and raiher weak
liberal pressure-group, to conquer entrenched self-
ishness, does well to have an intellectually water-
tight case.
It is not possible, in a brief note, to develop
that case fully, The Pearson Report hints at it; I
can only draw ou the hints. The point is this. Aid
is surposed to 'rk" by inducing rapid growth in parts
of the economy that will yield much savings or earn
much 2oreign exchange, thereby enabling the recipient
to ct off tho aid hook. Aid thus depends for its
success ov a tual criterion: both on a high rate of
return on the investment progre aided, and on a
growing willingness to divert that return from consunip-
tion t devlopment outlays.2 To secure this success,
donors and recipients must work together to concentrate
the national development progranmte on sectors with
satisfactory returns, properly used. But what are
these sectors?
1
But not, I hope, that the donor's short-run balance of
payments improves by aid. The UK Treasury is quite
shrewd enough to realise (probably sooner rather than
later) that, even if £1 given to the International De-
velopment Association ultimately brings in 30s. of
exports, there are cheaper ways than gifts of achieving
that result. One coentator objects succinctly, "I
have never noticed propaganda efficiency to be in any
way associated with intellectual consistency". In the
long run I disagree, because the propagandist's morale
matters too much, and because the targets of inaccurate
propaganda learn - and reject. Whether Truth is often
put to the worse in a free and open encounter is, of
course, an open question.
2Economists will recognise these as versioas, prhaps "pop"
or perhaps "realistic", of the "social maginal product"
and the "reinvestment" criterion, respoedvely.
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The sectors to which Pearson devotes relevant atten-
tion are agriculture (pp. 32-6, 61-3) and population
policy (pp. 194-99). In these sectors, the first part of
our dual criterion - a high rate of return to investment
in aid-receiving nations - is usually fulfilled. Although
limits are placed on birth-control outlays by shortages
of lady doctors and paramedical personnel, up to those
limits (which aid can help remove) these outlays yield
much more than comparable uses of funds.1 Ariculture
is a much bigger fund-user, which has just benefited by
new techniques (based on seed breeding) that produce more
output mainly by using an abundant resource, labour. Even
before these new techniques became available, agriculture
produced li-2 times as2much output, per unit of new in-
vestment, as industry.
Furthermore, it is not just a matter of the total
y-ieid-, but. of its dis tributi.on. The contribution of
investments to human welfare in LDCs depends largely on
the relief of poverty and joblessness. Both these forms
of investment help the really poor: agriculture by
growing more and cheaper food, population control by
enabling the uneducated to benefit from techniques of
family limitation previously confined to rich urban
v1Ltboth sorts of outlay help relieve the
crucial job problem. On the whole, farm investment em-
ploys many more workers per £ than factory investment;
and each prevented birth, 12-15 years later, reduces
unemployment by one. Hence both sectors are obvious
priorities for aid-financed supplements to investment,
human and physical, as far as "development yield" -
growth, jobs, relies Q poverty - is concerned. Yet
1At very least fifteen times more, in India in the late
l960s, R. Cassen "Population Control", i P. treeten
and M. Lipton (eds.) The Crisis of Indian Planning,
Oxford, 1968, p. 261.
Lipton, "Strategy for Agriculture", ibid., pp. 89-90,
where it is shown th-at by allowing for the crudities of
this "capital/output ratio" yield indicator, we in fact
reinforce the conclusion.
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agriculture, which employs 7 out of 10 men in the poor
world, bas received only sope 12 per cent of aid - and
family planning has received hardly any. Is this be-
cause "yield" is not the whole story?
Indeed, high developmental pay-off - more jobs
and less poverty as well as more growth - is only half
of our dual criterion for aid allocation. The other
half is the recipient'S use of the pay-off to become
self-sufficient, i.e. to generate the taxes and savings
(and to earn tle foreign exchange) needed for growth
without outside help. But birth control helps here
too, since each new mouth to feed reduces the family's
ability to save or pay taxes. So the second half of
our criterion further strengthens the case for aid to
raise the role, in development plans, of population-
control outlays. What about farm investment? Its
yield - more food, more cotton - clearly helps the
recipient towards self-sufficiency in foreign exchange;
and there is no reason to believe that farm income is
any worse at producing saving than any other sort of
income.'
Apart from using aid to influence the sectoral
pattern of outlays, a donor has direct methods to help
a poor country to get off the aid hook. As for saving
self-sufficiency, the recipient's ideology (and hunch
for what will work) must dictate which of the following
paths are selected (and aided) in each case: measures
is true that an unusually large part of farm income
comprises wages or self-consumption; but wages are spent
on goods produced by savers and profit-takers, while
extra food output reduces the Government's need to spend
on food imports and famine relief, and raises the pro-
ducers taxable capacity. In India, regression analysis
suggests that extra farm income raises total national
saving by almost as much as extra non-farm income. E. T
Mathew, Agricultural Taxation In India, Asia, 1968. Fur-
ther, extra farm income both iequires and is spent on
imports to a lesser extent than other forms of extra in-
come.
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to raise the tax take by raising rates, devising new
taxes, and improving effective yields; incentives to
small savings; improving borrowing facilities for public
and for private sector; cutting current outlays by pub-
lic and/or private sector; and raising the 'permissible'
limits on deficit financing of public investment. As
for foreign-exchange self-sufficiency, aid can be used
te help the recipient produce or market more or better
exports, to help it to substitute for imports where
efficient, and even in some cases to train negotiators
to bargain harder (or more subtly) about the terms of
trade. These possibilities are not far-fetched; for
emnpla, the Sudan has received aid to transform ber
ry low direct-tax take. But nobody could argue that
aid policy as a whole bas been informed by a wish to
help recipients become more self-sufficient. The
Lasues of aid yield and of the use of yield, while
recognised in general, have not been translated into
sectoral priorities for aided progrm*s.
The Pearson Report, by concentrating on aid1 as
a self elhnating operation if properly channelled
and sufficiently supported, implicitly redirects our
attention to such priorities. However, the Report
does not go into them at all deeply. The improved
seeds are presented as miraculous source8 of agricul-
tural. growth2 - almost a pan-Asian panacea - and loops-
'n-pills as the cure for family-planning problems (p.56)
just when the serious difficulties of both these sets
1Only (j) true development aid, as opposed to (ii)
emergency relief or (iii) international income-tax
to transfer consumption from rich to poor can be
truly self-eliminating. There is a real place for
(ii) and (iii), but neither Pearson nor this paper
deals with them
2Growth rates of farm output involving 1966, a pan-
Asian disaster year, are the chosen means. Natur-
ally they are much higher for 1966-8 than 1960-66;
hence the post-1966 new seeds are proved to triumph
(p. 33). Row Green was my Revolution?
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of technocratic solutions are becoming clear. We need
to know more about how to hangc attitudes: to family
size, by State provision of minimal secuxity in old age
to replace reliance upon more and more children (p. 197);
to farm output, by enabling the farmer to keep the fruits
of his labour instead of giving them up to cropsharing
landlords, or to usurera with a sharp eye for a good crop
in a debtor's field; arid to the politics of allocating
resources where they pay off (and relieve need), in farm-
ing and family-planning, rather than where they satisfy
articulate but nefficient and well-protected pressure
groups, buidness and labour, in the organised urban sec-
tor. Concentrating on farms and population control is
the start f increasing the developmental pay-off to
aid - but only the start.
The search for self-sufficiency through aid, like
the search for growth, has remained at the level of huge
aggregates. In this failing can be subsumed most of the
reasons (from poor project evaluation to toleration for
plain corruption) why aid has done rather little to pro-
duce development, except when administered in massive
doses a la Taiwan. This failure is not necessary - aid
is just resources, after all, and resources properly used
are certain to yield that for which they are resources.
The Pearson Report tentatively points towards a sectoral
approachto.aid.1 If we do not get this, we shall soon
1mia is not a proposal for applying crude donor pressures.
The "loyal opposition" role of the aid donor, while con-
troversial, is well recognised. The proposal is simply
that donors translate into reality their talk about makiq
aided programmes higher-yielding and more conducive to re-
cipient self-sufficiency. The recipient cliinat.e (as with
the Indian emphasis on "self-reliance") is often highly
favourable to this. Purthermore, sectoral proposals do
not imply sector-tied aid; they are proposals for new
emphases within a total aided development progranmw, and
hence must fit into a macro-framework. But too often a
bad macro-framework is an excuse for ba projects. The
construction of the macro-framework up the spare
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get no aid at all. Donors, while they "aid" new capi-
tal cities and airports and hotels (or even half-
utflised steel mills and dams) will become increasingly
disillusioned with their allegedly spendthrift clients;
recipients will rightly say "to hell with your aid";
and the whole enterprise of international development
assistance will be aborted.
Economic analysis of aid must descend to sectors
and projects, and support only those that promise
development (equalisation and jobs as wellas growth)
and advance self-sufficiency. Donne said the last
word on the futility of confining manifestations of
love, whether sexual or international, to the sphere
of large abstractions:-
So must pure lovers' souls descend
To affections and to faculties
Which sense may reach and apprehend,
Else a great Prince in prison lies.
model-building capacity of Divitia's economics depart-
ments, and the completion of the projects that of her
steel-mill--building industry; but both framework and
steel-mills merely add to the bad debts of Ruritania.
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